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Introduction
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), a topic of much debate since the early 1990s, proposes to radically enhance the United States' future war fighting abilities. Proponents promise that this technology will accomplish more with less as we shift from a platformcentric to a network-centric military. However, this debate tends to minimize the complications involved with integrating future coalition partners into the network, even as multinational interoperability continues to challenge our military today.
We have fought a majority of our wars with coalition partners. At the strategic level, civilian (and senior military) leaders have pieced together coalitions to gain international legitimacy and domestic support for a conflict. These countries then contribute their military resources, often very limited, toward the common effort. These coalitions are typically restricted in the time and the means to plan and rehearse operations together, leaving Combatant Commanders and their staffs scrambling to figure out where these nations fit into the operational and tactical levels. This problem will be exacerbated in the future by NCW: Combatant Commanders will have an increasingly difficult time incorporating coalition partners without jeopardizing the effects of new technologies.
However, if we consider multinational forces according to their operational functions, identify and properly develop shortfalls in their capabilities, and plan to incorporate them into the appropriate time and space, then the effectiveness of the coalition can be enhanced without jeopardizing the benefits of NCW.
What is Network Centric Warfare?
In theory, NCW enhances command and control of military forces by capitalizing on an increased number of computer networked relationships among personnel, sensors, weapons systems, and their commanders. These increases in connectivity are intended to significantly reduce the time required to transfer critical information regarding an enemy's intentions, thereby condensing the time commanders need to make decisions and react. This compression in the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) cycle is supposed to render the enemy helpless as friendly forces act before he can gain any momentum in a given course of action. If the increased tempo is persistent, the enemy's forces will be rendered impotent and their strategic will to fight broken.
The Problem of Making Other Nations Fit
Although proponents of NCW theory argue that it can enhance the speed of operations, its application in a multilateral environment can generate friction. This friction results from two factors, the strategic desire or necessity to increase the number of coalition partners, and the military requirement at the operational level to efficiently and effectively integrate these nations into a multinational force.
Increasing the number of coalition partners for a conflict generally adds to its legitimacy in the international community. It gives at least the appearance that the United States is not the only state, with an interest in the outcome, willing to shoulder the burden.
To accomplish a particular objective, U.S. civilian leadership must prudently manage the resources required to implement it and monitor the will of the people. Fighting in a multinational coalition offers the U.S. political legitimacy, which helps to bolster domestic support. In addition, it "can reduce the political, financial, manpower and equipment costs" for conflicts we would otherwise fight alone. 1 However, this does not mean that a larger coalition is more likely to guarantee victory.
The process of integrating multinational forces into a fighting entity does not lend itself to efficiency nor is it always effective. The more assonant a nation's military forces are to our own, the easier it is to incorporate them usefully into an operation. However, the U.S.
is engaged in shifting its focus from a platform-centric force to a network-centric one, making it increasingly difficult to form an effective multinational fighting force.
Capitalizing on NCW's speed of operations will prove very difficult if other nations retain platform-centric forces largely incompatible with a network environment. The U.S. must ensure that efforts to integrate these forces do not degrade the effectiveness of the network.
Several factors will hinder these efforts: e.g., technology, command and control structures, equipment, culture, sharing of information, doctrine, and training. or even at night. This can affect the speed of an operation and permit the enemy to regroup during an undesired operational pause. Overall, the cultural variations between potential coalition partners add tremendous complexity to network-centric operations, and must be taken into consideration.
Another inhibitor to the efforts of NCW with multinational forces is the sharing of information. A key element of NCW is the ability to exchange information faster. Such information can range from the position of supplies to intelligence about the enemy. It is essential for an effective fighting force to share information. As some countries are unable to link into a network environment, they will be left out of the loop, but they may also have critical intelligence that is essential to the mission. 7 Simply supplying equipment to coalition partners will not ensure their compatibility, it is essential that we help them establish the doctrine to employ the equipment as well.
Training has also been identified as an issue for coalitions in a network-centric environment. Although the U.S. spends a significant amount of time and resources training its forces, not all countries are able to do the same. Training requires that the expertise reside within the organization, otherwise it must be acquired elsewhere. The U.S. has had years of experience working out the details through trial and error, and has been able to incorporate this experience into its training programs. As the U.S. develops NCW concepts and weapon systems to support them, it will incorporate the required training programs into its schools.
Some countries do not have the same luxury and will arrive in theater still needing the proper training. This may hinder the effectiveness of U.S. network-centric forces. This problem needs to be solved in advance to prevent these situations from occurring.
While issues such as expense of technology, inability to create an integrated C2 structure, lack of compatible equipment, integration of differing cultures, inability to share information, and lack of doctrine and training will always hamper operational efficiency and effectiveness, it does not mean that network-centric operations cannot work in a multinational environment. We have to find creative ways to work around the problems.
Breaking Down the Problem
Some have argued that the U.S. should either slow technology development to allow other nations to keep pace, completely leave them behind by continuing our rapid technological progress, or develop our technology to allow them to "plug-in." 8 However, a pure form of any of these options will not permit the U.S. to accomplish its objectives.
Slowing technology development defeats the purpose of advancing our technology and may permit a potential enemy to keep pace or even pass the U.S. by. Likewise, leaving potential coalition partners behind in the technological race might render a coalition partner largely ineffective on the battlefield. Depending on how their forces are utilized this may negate the designed intentions of NCW. Finally, developing our systems to enable complete interoperability would greatly increase the development and procurement costs, something that we may choose not to do.
It must be accepted that incorporating every potential coalition member into every aspect of an operation is too large a task, an impossible one really, given our resource constraints. Current joint doctrine for multinational operations states that the Multinational Force Commander (MNFC) "must be aware of the differences in the political constraints and capabilities of the forces of various nations, and consider these differences when assigning Finally, incorporate this information into the planning process. These matrices should be included into the deliberate planning process and crisis action planning methodology. These assessments can be made available to all Combatant Commanders and Functional Commanders for planning purposes, as they will commonly have to incorporate foreign forces outside their AOR. The availability of the information will prevent a last minute scramble to utilize a country somewhere in the operation because our strategic leadership mandated it.
Theory Meets Reality
It is easy to sit behind a desk and say that anything is possible, but theories do not always hold water in the real world. Restraints, such as constitutional limitations, size of ones' forces, and interaction between different cultures, can nullify any theory. Let us discuss how countries could contribute to the NCW concept by focusing the operational functions lens on their capabilities, and consider any obstacles that may prevent their utilization. We will use historical examples from countries in the Pacific Command AOR and center the discussion on three operational functions: protection, intelligence and logistics.
Protection
Operational protection focuses on preventing and mitigating hostile actions against friendly resources, facilities and critical information. 10 This can range from providing air defenses to escorting convoys of supplies during relief efforts. It is not limited in scope, as it covers all phases of an operation and is necessary for all of the operational factors of space, time and force.
In an ideal networked environment, forces conducting protection missions would be connected with intelligence assets to warn them of potential security threats, or to provide targeting solutions for modern weapons. The inability to link into this picture would reduce the overall effectiveness of the protection asset and create a multinational force (MNF) vulnerability for the enemy to exploit. However, as stated previously, not all nations will be able to afford or choose to afford this technology. These nations could be assigned missions requiring a lesser degree of information or provided with compatible equipment to facilitate their integration.
Linking air and naval assets into a network is a feasible task since they contain Some may quibble at this idea, but lessons from Iraqi Freedom have shown that there was a large need for security forces from other nations, but they "did not appear in quantitative measures." 15 Another solution is to train certain foreign military members in English, such as the Thai officers in the unit previously mentioned. Then we could utilize these forces more appropriately, without the need for our own translators or liaison officers.
Some countries choose not to send troops into hostile environments, but their forces can be utilized in protection roles outside the area of operations. U.S. forces utilize bases in countries all over the world as forward staging areas. These bases require security forces to protect American service members and their families. As more U.S. forces were being utilized in OEF and OIF, the Japanese government approved measures to step up security efforts for American forces located in their country. 16 Efforts like this free U.S. personnel, who are more compatible in the network-centric environment, to be deployed elsewhere.
Operational protection is an area where many countries can integrate their forces. If an incompatibility issue arises, the Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation
Plan can focus on improving that element over time. The plan can incorporate foreign military sales of network compatible equipment, or provide American education for foreign military personnel, to educate them in English and our military doctrine.
Intelligence
Operational intelligence is an essential element in a multinational operation and represents one of the more sensitive areas for interoperability. NCW is heavily reliant upon intelligence to understand the enemy's intentions and provide friendly forces the ability to predict his movements. For nations in the future, logistics is an area where the network-centric world will actually be feasible. The U.S. military is using commercial off-the-shelf technology to track parts and cargo from the factory to the field. This is technology that many other nations could employ relatively cheaply by incorporating sensors into their transport aircraft. A new DoD directive requires all palletized cargo to contain a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag. These are microchips containing digitized information that includes a list of supplies on the pallet. These tags are less than 20 cents each and the transceivers to scan them are roughly $1,000 each. 26 Devices like these are easily affordable for most nations.
As countries integrate into the common logistics supply system, like the Japanese transport aircraft that conducted 143 re-supply and transport sorties within the Pacific Command AOR, they can perform missions without degrading the networked picture.
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Other nations can provide airfields and ports for U.S. forces and their coalition partners to use as forward operating bases. Singapore has fulfilled this role for many years for U.S. ships and aircraft. These agreements can be established with poorer countries years in advance of any potential conflict. This would give the U.S. time to improve the infrastructure and provide a benefit to any developing country.
Conclusion
The problems associated with incorporating multinational coalitions into our Network Centric Warfare concept should not be ignored. It is hard to predict the exact future of our network-centric force and even more difficult to determine where other nations fit into this notion. Although Combatant Commanders and their staffs may prefer to fight alone, our political leadership will continue to incorporate other countries into the fight. To overcome these challenges, we must identify those countries capable of being full-fledged partners and those that will have difficulty keeping up. By focusing on their capabilities through the lens of operational functions, joint staffs will have a foundation for the operational planning process. Then, where required, Combatant Commanders will be able to identify shortfalls and help develop these countries through Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Finally, these forces can be incorporated where they will have the least negative impact upon the system.
Although this process may appear to apply equally across all of the Combatant Commanders' areas of responsibility, it could be selectively applied. Our civilian leadership may be willing to accept that certain countries will never be able to fit into the NCW concept, either for economic or security reasons. This may permit a concentration of assets to be applied in other critical regions, thus building a group of more reliable coalition partners in the future. It could also be adjusted to focus on different components, perhaps navies in coastal countries, or air forces in landlocked countries.
While this analytical construct is not a panacea for a generating the perfect multinational coalition, it does provide a starting point. As Admiral Cebrowski stated, NCW "is not just a matter of introducing new technology; [it] is a matter of the co-evolution of that technology with operational concepts, doctrine, and organization." 28 This method needs to be incorporated into our multinational doctrine. Simply stating a potential solution to the problem does not make it a part of the institutional process. History has shown that multinational partners have a lot to offer toward the unity of effort. It just takes creative leadership and planning to find everyone's niche.
